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This paper presents a simple Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey AK growth 
model with heterogeneity that explains how policies that increase income 
inequality may temporarily boost a country’s income growth rate. Briefly put, 
a change in policy that reduces redistributive transfers will free up resources 
to the households with the highest productivities, resulting in an aggregate 
growth rate increase that will endure until new limits to differentiated 
accumulation are found. The unambiguous effect takes place in poor and rich 
countries alike, arising from productivity heterogeneity and redistribution 
(although it could also arise from other sources of heterogeneity). The effect is 
explicitly captured in the aggregate growth equation by the changes of the 
mean logarithmic deviation (MLD or Theil’s second measure) of the income. 
The model supports the empirical results found in Forbes (AER, 2000). The 
accelerated growth episodes observed in Brazil from 1968 to 1973 and in 
China recently are shown to be empirically consistent with the model. If the 
model predictions are correct, Chinese growth rates may eventually fall, 
following a pattern that, even if not presenting the same magnitude, could 
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“The cake has to grow in order to be cut.” Delfim 
Netto, Minister of Finance during the Brazilian 
“economic miracle” period 
 
“Draw a cake to satisfy one’s hunger.” Chinese 
proverb 
1 Introduction 
A large body of literature addressing the relations between inequality 
and growth has been developed across the years. Yet, despite all the 
theoretical and empirical developments since the pioneering work of Kuznets, 
much theoretical and empirical disagreement remains. This paper will try to 
add to the literature by bringing in another possible connection between 
these two economic variables, one that, to a certain extent, has been 
disregarded both theoretically and empirically. The connection can be found 
in accelerated growth episodes that happened at the cost of permanently 
higher levels of income inequality. Those episodes are defined here as cases of 
inequality-driven growth. 
The paper will use a Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey AK growth model based 
on households with heterogeneous productivity levels. The household 
production function will incorporate spillovers from public capital and from 
private capital owned by other households, which will work as a 
redistribution mechanism. 
The combination of heterogeneous productivities with the 
redistribution mechanism implied by the spillovers, under given conditions, 
will generate balanced growth income trajectories defined by an equilibrium 
distribution of income and a unique income growth rate common to all 
households. A log-linearized version of the model will be aggregated and, as a 
result, the aggregate growth rate will be decomposed into three parts, which 
represent the negative time preference effect, the positive aggregate 
productivity effect, and the positive inequality-driven effect – the latter 
representing the original contribution of this paper.   3
This effect should not be confounded with the savings rate effect from 
the Keynesian literature, which may have an ambiguous sign for poor and 
rich countries and may affect growth rates temporarily or permanently.1 The 
inequality-driven growth effect presented here does not depend on any 
special assumption regarding the savings behavior. It results exclusively 
from productivity heterogeneity and aggregation.2 
The model will then be used to investigate how redistributive policy 
changes may not only permanently affect growth rates but also generate 
inequality-driven growth episodes. 
The presence of an inequality-driven growth component in the 
aggregate growth equation lends support to the strong empirical  findings of 
Forbes (2000). As summarized in that paper, “(empirical) results suggest 
that, in the short and medium term, an increase in a country’s level of income 
inequality has a significant positive relationship with subsequent economic 
growth. This relationship is highly robust across samples, variable 
definitions, and model specifications.” 
Two empirical cases will be discussed: the Brazilian “economic miracle” 
high-growth period, and the recent Chinese high-growth episode. Data for the 
two countries will be analyzed under the scope of the previously developed 
model, and the similarities between the two cases will be considered. The two 
countries will be shown to possibly present inequality-driven growth 
dynamics. 
                                            
1 See Gersovitz (1988) for a discussion on the relations between savings and growth. 
2 The inequality-driven growth effect is an aggregation effect and, as such, it can result from 
any source of inequality. In this paper, productivity heterogeneity is chosen as the source, to 
ensure that it is not confounded with other effects yet established in the growth literature.   4
2  A Simple AK Growth Model with Productivity 
Heterogeneity 
2.1  The AK Model 
  The endogenous growth model that is presented here is based on a 
Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey framework with an AK production function.3 
  Consider therefore an economy with a large number of households 
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where 
  0 > ρ ,   and    1 0 < θ < . 
  To keep the representation as simple as possible, and without loss of 
generality, it is assumed, as in other AK models, that capital is represented 
by a single variable that encompasses all production factors. The production 
function depends not only on the household’s private capital but also on 
spillovers from public capital and other household’s private capital. 
  The government appropriates a fixed proportion of each household’s 
total stock of capital in order to make public capital available to every 
household. Notice that the appropriation mechanism described here does not 
imply legal expropriation of private property. This representation works 
exactly like an income tax, with the advantage however of creating a simpler 
and more tractable description of the economy. 
  The after-tax production function is accordingly defined as 
  ( )
η − γ − 1 η γ = pnt pt gt n pnt pt gt n K K K A K K K f ~ ~ , ~ , ~ , 
                                            
3 See, for example, Aghion and Howitt (1998) or Jones and Manuelli (1997).   5
where 
  1 0 < τ < ,    1 0 ≤ η ≤ ,    1 0 ≤ γ ≤ ,    1 0 < η + γ ≤ ,    0 > n A , 
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  In the equations above, Knt is the household’s total capital, which has 
two components, Kpnt, the private capital not appropriated by the 
government, and Kgnt, the part of the household’s total capital that is 
appropriated by the government for public use, which is determined as a 
fixed proportion τ of the total capital.4 
  The household’s production level depends on the productivity 
parameter  An (which is heterogeneous across households), on the private 
capital level Kpnt, and on the spillovers from the geometric average of all 
appropriated capital levels  gt K ~  and from the geometric average of all private 
capital levels  pt K ~ . 
  In the production function above, government policies can affect two 
parameters: the tax rate τ and the redistribution parameter η. The tax rate τ 
represents redistributions that affect the amount of public capital available 
to all households, and, as such, it redistributes wealth following the principle 
of  equality of opportunities. Meanwhile the redistribution parameter η 
represents, at least in part, the government will to socialize final production, 
and, as such, it redistributes wealth following the principle of equality of 
results. Note that a γ+η or τ that approaches one implies communism 
(absence of private property). Values of η between zero and 1-γ define varying 
degrees of socialism (equalization of results). 
  The redistribution parameter η is subject only in part to government 
control, since it represents any possible spillover that is not related to public 
capital, such as: government-enforced income transfers, donations, charity, 
                                            
4 Under the household’s perspective, the capital tax is equivalent to an income tax rate 
()
η − γ − τ − − = π
1 1 1 , since  ( )( )
tax before 1 1 1 tax after 1 ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ − η − γ − η γ η − γ − η − γ − η γ − π − = τ − = = nt nt pt gt n pnt pt gt n nt Y K K K A K K K A Y .   6
crime, epidemics, riots, specialization, trade, or any other positive or negative 
externality originating from private capital. Given the unbalanced nature of 
those externalities, a zero-sum restriction on the redistributive transfers will 
typically not hold.5 
  Finally, notice that households must observe the budget constraint 
  ( ) 1 , ~ , ~
+ ∆ + ≥ = nt nt pnt pt gt nt K C K K K f Y , (2.1) 
and also that the production function can be rewritten as: 
  ( ) ( )
η − γ − 1 η + γ γ − γ τ − τ = = nt t n nt t n nt K K A K K f Y ~ 1 , ~ 1 . (2.2) 
2.2 First-Order  Conditions 
Assume now that all necessary conditions for the existence of an 
interior solution hold. The first-order conditions are thereafter given by: 
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  ( ) ( ) η − γ − τ − τ = φ
γ − 1 γ 1 1 , (2.3) 
which, when combined, lead to the Euler equation 
 










































  Now, assume that  ( ) 1 ~ << φ
η + γ
nt t n K K A , and take the logarithm of the 
equation above to find 
                                            
5 Note that the values of  gt K ~  and  pt K ~  for an isolated household are zero. A hermit household 





























1 , (2.4) 
where  1 1 ln + + = nt nt C c . This Euler equation describes the household 
consumption growth rate as an increasing function of the household 
productivity An, as expected. Additionally, from (2.3), it is also a decreasing 
function of the household discount factor ρ, of the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion θ, and of the relative wealth level  t nt K K ~ . The relation between the 
consumption growth rate and the tax rate τ and the redistribution parameter 
η can be positive or negative. 
2.3  The Log-Linearized Euler Equation 
  In order to easily aggregate equation (2.4), a log-linearized version 
needs to be found. From equation (2.2), 
 


























  Assume that savings rates change slowly compared to the growth rates 
of the economy, such that, from (2.1), 
  ( ) nt nt nt nt y s y c ∆ ≈ − ∆ + ∆ = ∆ 1 ln . 
  Applying the assumption above and equation (2.5) to equation (2.4) 


























1 , (2.6) 
where  nt t nt Y Y H ~ =  represents the relative income gap of the household, and 
 





  Log-linearizing equation (2.6) results in the following approximation: 
  nt n nt h y β + α ≈ ∆ +1 , (2.7)   8
where 
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= β , 













  t nt nt nt y y H h − = = ln  
is the logarithmic income gap. 
  Consider now the two parameters in equation (2.7). Parameter β 
represents the redistributive effectiveness of the economy. The higher the β, 
the more significant will be the transfers of growth rates between households, 
due to government interventions or due to positive or negative social 
externalities, and the lower will be the income inequality, as will be shown 
later. 
 Parameter  αn, on the other hand, summarizes the household 
productivity contribution to growth, conditional on economic incentives. It 
represents innate skills and non-sharable environmental advantages and 
disadvantages, but also depends on government policies defined by τ and η, 
since those policies affect the incentive structure of the economy. 
2.4  The Aggregation Method 
  Consider now a simplified version of the log-linear aggregation method 
presented in Albuquerque (2003). Take I+1 vectors representing the values of 
I+1 variables for N households at time t, 
  [] [ ] ′ = ′ = iNt int t i it Nt nt t t X X X Y Y Y L L L L 1 1 , X Y , 
where 
  t N n I i X Y int nt ∀ = = > > , , , 1 , , , 1 , 0 , 0 K K , 
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then the relationship among the aggregate variables  t Y  and  it X  at each 
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and the term 
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represents distributional effects, where 



















is the sample analog of the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD), also known as 















































  Note that all components of Dt represent relative measures of 
inequality, meaning that Dt is scale invariant. 
  The logarithmic version of (2.8) is 
  ( ) Nt t t It I t t t d x a x a x a y X X Y , , , 1 2 2 1 1 K L + + + + = , (2.9) 
where 
  () () ⋅ = ⋅ = = D d X x Y y it it t t ln and , ln , ln . 
                                            
6 It is illustrative to reproduce here the properties of this measure according to Bourguignon 
(1979): “That the inequality measure L has seldom been used in applied works on income 
distribution is somewhat surprising because it has very much to commend it. Besides the fact 
that it is decomposable … and satisfies the basic properties of an inequality measure, L lends 
itself to a very simple interpretation in terms of social welfare. In the utilitarian framework, 
the social welfare function is the sum of identical concave individual utility function. If we 
choose the logarithm form for those utility functions, L is simply the difference between the 
maximum social welfare for a given total income, which corresponds to the equalitarian 
distribution, and the actual social welfare.”   10
2.5 Aggregating  the  Model 
A literal solution to the aggregation problem can now be provided. 
From equation (2.7): 
  nt n nt nt h y y β + α + = +1 . (2.10) 
  Equation (2.9) can be applied to equation (2.10), resulting in the 
following per household aggregate income equation: 
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since 
  ( ) ( ) t t t t t L L h H h H H = + = = ln , 
and 
  () ( ) ( ) t t t L L d H H H β − ∆ = + + 1 1 . 
2.6 Balanced  Growth 
  Assume now that the income distribution converges to some relative 
income profile under balanced growth such that 
* *
n n y c ∆ = ∆  and, from 
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where  nt t t n Y Y H ~ lim
*
∞ → =  represents the balanced growth relative income gap of 
the household. 
  Balanced growth is thereafter feasible if and only if   11




























  n ∀ > η + γ , 0 . (2.13) 
This AK model may represent therefore a society that accepts the 
existence of an arbitrary level of income inequality, but that does not accept 
income inequality divergence. The redistribution parameter η and the tax 
rate τ guarantee that the aggregate economy growth engine work for every 
household, at least in the long run, as long as condition (2.13) holds. The 
model is able to capture thereafter the Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) 
tunnel effect hypothesis. 
From equations (2.7) and (2.11), balanced growth is defined as a set of 
household income growth trajectories where 
  n y y n ∀ α = ∆ = ∆ ,
* * , (2.14) 
with household income distributed according to a vector of logarithmic 













* . (2.15) 
  According to equation (2.15), the relative income distribution under 
balanced growth will depend on the distribution of the household productivity 
parameter Α. Ceteris paribus, the more unequal the values of Α, the higher 
the income inequality. On the other hand, the higher the redistributive 
effectiveness β, the lower the income inequality. Finally, the effect of the tax 
rate τ on inequality can be both positive and negative, since an increase of the 
tax rate may lead either to an increase or to a reduction of the variability of 
α.   12
2.7  Growth Rate Structural Decomposition 
  Equation (2.11) reveals that the per household income growth rate can 
be divided into two components: α , which is related to mean values, and 
() 1 + ∆ t L H , which represents distribution effects. 
 Component  α  is a constant encompassing the negative time preference 
effect  θ ρ −  plus the positive aggregate productivity effect  θ φA . Component 
() t L H ∆ , on the other hand, represents the inequality-driven growth effect on 
aggregate growth. 
  This result can be summarized by the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: Under the assumption of a simple log-linear 
structural growth model, the aggregate growth rate of an economy can be 
decomposed into three additive terms: the negative time preference effect  θ ρ − , 
the positive aggregate productivity effect  θ φA , and the inequality-driven 
effect  () t L H ∆ . 
  The most important feature of Proposition 1 is that it reveals a 
component of aggregate growth rates that unambiguously depends on 
inequality, which can be explicitly measured through MLD (Theil’s second 
measure) changes, and which is mostly disregarded in the current inequality 
and growth literature. This component of aggregate growth rates should 
appear in any aggregated log-linear growth model based on heterogeneous 
households subject to redistribution mechanisms, since the component arises 
not at the structural level, but at the aggregation procedure level. 7 
                                            
7 To understand the effect captured by this growth component, a parallel can be made with 
the case of a locomotive pulling a caboose by means of an elastic cable. The locomotive 
represents high-productivity households, while the caboose represents low-productivity 
households. The elastic cable represents the redistribution mechanism. Even if no structural 
parameter is changing (productivity levels, time preference, risk aversion coefficients – the 
power sources and the frictions), once the cable is made more elastic, the result is a 
temporary acceleration of any reference point near the locomotive (the equivalent of the per 
capita income), at the cost of permanently higher inequality levels (the cable will stretch   13
  For example, in Albuquerque (2003) a simple nonstructural 
heterogeneous log-linear growth model presenting asymmetric productivity 
shocks for skilled and unskilled households is used to explain, theoretically 
and empirically, some features the American “new economy” accelerated 
productivity growth episode in the nineties. In that model, an increase in 
productivity inequality is what causes the inequality-driven effect. The 
inequality-driven effect can be generally interpreted therefore as the result of 
an aggregation “growth identity,” obtained from equation (2.9), rather than 
the result of particular structural model hypotheses. 
3  Redistributive Policies and the Creation of 
Inequality-Driven Growth 
3.1  Permanent Effects of Redistribution 
  In equation (2.12) and in Proposition 1, the time preference component 
of  α  does not depend on government policies. The aggregate productivity 
component of α, on the other hand, represents the aggregate productivity 
conditional on economic incentives and externalities, capturing two possible 
effects of redistribution on the aggregate growth rate that reproduce aspects 
found in the inequality and growth literature. 
3.1.1  The Economic Interactions Effect 
  This economic spillover effect arises from two sources. The first source 
reflects the benefits of economic interactions through the formation of public 
capital. Without these economic interactions, production is not possible. 
Government uses taxes to appropriate a part of each household’s private 
                                                                                                                                  
further). Finally, when the cable is again fully stretched, the locomotive will fall down to the 
previous speed and acceleration, since it will be subject once more to the deadweight and 
additional friction of the caboose.   14
capital in order to provide society with a certain level of public capital, and by 
doing this, up to a certain point, it not only raises production levels, but also 
the balanced growth rate of the economy.8 From (2.12): 
  0 >
τ ∂
α ∂
 when  γ = τ < τ
* , 
where  γ = τ
*  is the optimal tax rate. Excessive appropriation of private 
capitals, on the other hand, is inefficient, leading to reductions in the 
production level and aggregate growth rate of the economy: 




* τ > τ . 
  The second source reflects private capital spillovers. A net benefit from 
economic specialization and trade arises when an economy of hermits is 
transformed by trade and specialization into an economy with private capital 
spillovers. The private and public capital spillovers, during the first stages of 
economic development, imply a positive effect of redistribution on aggregate 
wealth and growth. 
3.1.2  The Political Economy Effect 
  Once society achieves balanced growth under optimal taxation, it 
cannot benefit anymore from the spillovers. The allocative distortions of the 
redistribution mechanism – the political economy effect discussed for example 
in Barro (2000) and Asano (2002) – may dominate the relation between 
inequality and growth. Political pressure for inequality reductions will imply 
that the higher the redistribution levels (the higher the values of β), the more 
important the allocative distortions that reduce the equilibrium growth rate 
of the economy and the level of wealth. From (2.12): 




                                            
8 A survey on the effects of redistributive government spending on growth can be found in 
Carneiro et al. (2002).   15
  Consider therefore the following proposition, which summarizes the 
model permanent effects of inequality on growth: 
 Proposition  2:  A country will benefit most from the economic 
interactions effect (spillovers from public and private capitals) during the 
early stages of development, when its tax rate is low. Higher taxation levels 
during this stage will increase wealth and growth but also increase income 
inequality. However, as the country reaches balanced growth with optimal 
taxation, the political economy effect becomes the most important, and 
allocation distortions ensue if redistribution is enforced. Increases in public 
capital levels, obtained through increases in the tax rate τ, will reduce income 
inequality at the cost of permanently lower growth rates. Increases in 
redistribution effectiveness through a higher β w i l l  h a v e  t h e  s a m e  p o s i t i v e  
effect on income distribution but negative effect on growth. 
  Notice that, somewhat paradoxically, in early stages of development 
with low taxation levels, higher levels of taxation and higher levels of public 
capital will lead to an increase in income inequality. This happens because 
the increase in taxation and public capital, up to a certain level, allows high-
productivity households to unlock their dormant skills, and, as such, to 
differentiate themselves from low-productivity households. 
  This result, on the other hand, agrees with the Kuznets inverted-U 
hypothesis.9 If a country, during its development history, goes from a low 
taxation level (below the optimal level) to a high taxation level (above the 
optimal level), as it should normally be the case, inequality levels will 
increase during early stages of development, and decrease during final 
stages. This paper’s model is consistent therefore with a public capital 
accumulation explanation of the inverted-U hypothesis. 
                                            
9 The Kuznets inverted-U hypothesis proposes that income inequality increases during the 
initial development stages and decreases during the final development stages of a country. 
See Kuznets (1955).    16
3.2  Transitory Effects of Redistribution: Inequality-
Driven Growth 
During the transition from one balanced growth with lower inequality 
to another with higher inequality, the value of the component  () 1 + ∆ t L H  in 
equation (2.11) raises from zero. The positive values of  ( ) 1 + ∆ t L H  temporarily 
boost the aggregate growth rates of the economy. 
Eventually, the economy will reach the new balanced growth with 
higher levels of inequality, and the permanent growth rate will return to a 
lower level. This transitory effect applies to poor and rich countries alike and 
is unambiguous. It should not be confounded with the saving rates effect 
found in the Keynesian literature. Consider then the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: A reduction in redistribution effectiveness or a tax 
rate decrease that promotes higher inequality levels will lead, ceteris paribus, 
to an unambiguous transitory increase of the growth rate for poor and rich 
countries alike. The growth rate boost will endure until a new balanced 
growth, characterized by permanently higher levels of inequality, is eventually 
reached. Episodes characterized by this type of dynamics are defined here as 
inequality-driven growth periods. 
  Proposition 3 reveals that government policies can lead to transitory 
increases of aggregate growth rates at the cost of permanently higher levels 
of income inequality. Policy makers may thereafter be tempted to temporarily 
stimulate aggregate growth by allowing inequality to grow, independently of 
the permanent effects on growth rates, which, according to the inequality and 
growth literature, may be positive or negative.10 In the next two sections, two 
empirical examples will be shown to possibly represent inequality-driven 
growth  episodes. 
                                            
10 See, for example, Barro (2000).   17
  The inequality-driven effect, represented by component  () 1 + ∆ t L H  in 
equation (2.11), lends support to the strong empirical findings of Forbes 
(2000). In that paper, panel data methods are applied to a data set 
representing 45 countries and 180 observations. As summarized by Forbes, 
“results suggest that, in the short and medium term, an increase in a 
country’s level of income inequality has a significant positive relationship 
with subsequent economic growth. This relationship is highly robust across 
samples, variable definitions, and model specifications.” 
  To see that Forbes’ empirical results are supported by this paper’s 
model, notice that equation (2.11) can be rewritten as 
( ) 1
*
1 + + ∆ = ∆ − ∆ t t L y y H , 
where  α = ∆
* y  represents the steady state aggregate growth rate. Changes in 
inequality have to be therefore strongly correlated with growth rate 
departures from an equilibrium value. This theoretical result holds under 
somewhat general conditions, and as such may serve as a theoretical 
foundation for Forbes’ empirical findings.11 
4  A Cake Waiting to Be Cut: The Brazilian 
“Economic Miracle” 
  From 1968 to 1973, Brazil experimented a period of high growth rates 
that came to be known as the Brazilian “economic miracle” period. This 
period, according to the usual interpretation, was the result, among other 
things, of high levels of foreign savings, mostly based on government 
borrowing in foreign capital markets, of an increase in mandated domestic 
savings, of the achievement, during the previous years, of fiscal discipline, 
                                            
11 Forbes’ results were based on the use of the Gini coefficient as inequality measure, what 
would imply, according to this paper’s model, a specification error. Yet, the specification error 
is probably not very significant, since changes in the Gini coefficients tend to be highly 
correlated with changes in the MLD.   18
and of central-planned measures that ranged from managed trade policies to 
an omnipresent system of subsidies and government credit. See, for example, 
Fishlow (1972), Sjaastad (1974), Fields (1977), Ahluwalia et al. (1980), 
Beckerman and Coes (1980), Fields (1980), Fishlow (1980), and Fox (1983) for 
additional details. 
  The period was marked by exceptionally high yearly growth rates and 
substantial increases in income inequality, as can be seen in Appendix 1, 
Graph 1, and in the following table: 
 
Period  Real GDP per Worker, 
Yearly Logarithmic Growth 
MLD, 
Yearly Change 
1961-1967 0.029  0.003 
1968-1973  0.073  0.017 
1974-1980 0.032  -0.010 
1981-1989 0.011  0.015 
 
  The real GDP data in this table comes from Heston et al. (2002), and 
the data for income inequality comes from the “high quality” WIID databank 
based on Deininger and Squire (1997). The MLD values were calculated 
using the databank income distribution quintiles.12 
  It is easy to notice from the table above that the “economic miracle” 
period (shadowed) was exceptional when compared to all others. The income 
inequality, measured by the MLD, grows faster than in any other period. The 
yearly real GDP growth rate per worker during the “miracle” period is 
approximately 4.2% higher than the rates that prevailed during the 
preceding and succeeding periods. Notice, however, that near half of this 
growth rate boost is explained by changes of income inequality levels. The 
inequality-driven effect is approximately equal to 1.7% per year. 
                                            
12 The inequality levels may be somewhat underestimated due to the quintile approximation, 
but notice that the yearly changes are less affected by this kind of approximation bias.   19
  The “economic miracle” period easily qualifies as an inequality-driven 
growth episode. To confirm this conclusion, the following OLS regression is 
run, with the caveat that inequality data for poor countries tend to be subject 
to a high amount of noise, and that the number of observations in the 
regression is small. Having that in mind, extensive testing is avoided, and 
only the main regression results are shown: 
 
  () () ( ) ( ) ( )
()
. 9 . 16 , 63 . 0 , 20
, 035 . 0 809 . 0 214 . 0
2
63 . 4 5 82 . 3 00 . 9 5
= = =




DEBT L L y y t t t t H H
 
 
  The regression sample ranges from 1970 to 1989 – the years before 
1970 do not present variation in inequality changes, due to the inexistence of 
intraperiod observations (inequality data in unobserved years were linearly 
interpolated), and as such they were discarded from the sample. The 
dependent variable represents the five-year logarithmic growth rate of the 
real GDP per worker, and the independent variables represent the five-year 
change of the MLD and a dummy variable (DEBT) that takes care of the debt 
shock of 1981. The values between parentheses and under the estimated 
parameters represent t-statistics. All parameters are significant at a 
significance level of 1%. The regression explains 63% of the dependent 
variable variations. The regression fit is presented in Appendix 1, Graph 2. 
As it can be seen, the fit is surprisingly good. 
  Interestingly, the hypothesis that the inequality change parameter in 
the regression above is equal to one cannot be rejected. This result should not 
be seen as expected. From Proposition 2, it can be seen that this result is only 
possible if the inequality change component is statistically independent from 
other growth rate components. It may be the case, however, that this 
Brazilian episode represents exactly such an extreme case of inequality-
driven growth, with enough variation in inequality to enable the model to 
reveal the aggregate growth “identity” given by equation (2.11).   20
  Someone could argue that the regression is flawed because income 
growth and inequality changes could be nonstationary variables, and a 
cointegration model should be considered. To evaluate this possibility, a 
cointegration test was applied to the series (under the risk of running into 
overfitting), with the following results: 
 
Johansen Cointegration Rank Test 
13 
Series  p  LR Max LR Min Estimated Cointegration 
Vector 








− − 68 . 8 71 . 4
0.038 - , 1.10 - , 1  
 
  The cointegration test rejects the hypothesis of noncointegration, and 
does not reject the hypothesis of a unique cointegration vector. The 
hypothesis that the long-run parameter relating income growth to inequality 
changes is equal to one cannot be rejected, as in the OLS regression. It looks 
thereafter that the Brazilian experience cannot be rejected as an inequality-
driven growth episode. 
5  Drawing a Cake: High Growth in China 
  The Chinese high growth episode, although much more protracted 
than the Brazilian, has in common the same exceptionally high growth rates 
and income inequality increases. This topic has been extensively described in 
previous studies, with a few examples represented by Khan and Riskin 
                                            
13 * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Johansen likelihood ratio (LR) cointegration rank 
test, trace statistic, intercept in cointegration equation, dummy for the debt shock in 1981; a 
significant LR Max statistic indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of cointegration rank 
equal to zero (rejection of noncointegration); a significant LR Min statistic indicates rejection 
of the null hypothesis of cointegration rank lower than or equal to one (rejection of 
noncointegration and of cointegration with one cointegrating vector); critical values come 
from Osterwald-Lenum (1992); p represents the number of lags as in Johansen and Juselius 
(1990); The Akaike lag-selection criterion (AIC) was employed in order to find p.   21
(1998), Yao (1999), Xu and Zou (2000), Meng (2001), Galbraith and Wang 
(2002), Park et al. (2002), and Zhang and Harvie (2002). 
  Unfortunately, the series for China are relatively short. Additionally, it 
should be noted that there is much dispute about the comparability of 
Chinese data with data from other countries, as discussed for example in 
Gibson et al (2001). Yet, the trends are clear, as summarized in Appendix 2, 
Graph 3, and in the following table, which uses, as in the Brazilian case, data 
from Heston et al. (2002) and from the “high quality” WIID income inequality 
databank: 
 
Period  Real GDP per Worker, 
Yearly Logarithmic Growth 
MLD, 
Yearly Change 
1981-1984 0.064  -0.012 
1985-1992  0.046  0.016 
 
  The period between 1981 and 1984 is atypical, with very high growth 
rates and decreasing inequality levels. However, the years between 1985 and 
1992 (shadowed) can be seen as another case of inequality-driven growth 
episode. From the total yearly growth rate of 4.7%, approximately 1.6% can 
be attributed to inequality changes – what could represent a large part of a 
possible growth boost over a long-run growth trend. According to some of the 
studies cited above, the trend of inequality increase may have accelerated 
after 1992, meaning that the effect may have become even more significant 
afterwards. 
  Naturally, much of the high growth in China could be explained by 
structural changes captured by the other components described in 
Proposition 2. China also has one advantage over Brazil: it started its 
inequality-driven growth episode from much lower levels of inequality. In 
that sense, someone could argue that there is much leeway yet in Chinese 
society for income inequality increases. On the other hand, it could also be   22
argued that the Chinese culture of equality is rooted deeper than in other 
countries, meaning that the limits to income inequality increases may be 
reached sooner than expected.  
  There is evidence that, during the seventies, the tunnel effect 
presented itself in Brazil, finally leading society to pressure the authoritarian 
government for effective redistributive policies, in a mechanism discussed for 
example in Iglesias (1998). One proof of the importance of this phenomenon is 
the extensive literature concerning income inequality in Brazil, which was 
produced mainly during the seventies (a parallel can be made with the 
current sprout of literature concerning income inequality in China). To make 
things worse, while social pressures for redistribution and democracy were 
mounting, Brazil had to face significant negative economic shocks, like the oil 
shock and the debt crisis. All those factors together explain the sudden and 
significant reduction of growth rates in Brazil. 
  Given the similarities between the two growth episodes, it is 
reasonable to assume that Chinese growth rates may eventually present the 
same falling pattern, even if not as severe as the one observed in Brazil. 
6 Conclusions 
  This paper presents a simple Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey AK growth 
model with heterogeneity that explains how policies that increase income 
inequality may temporarily boost a country’s income growth rate. Briefly put, 
a change in policy that reduces redistributive transfers will free up resources 
to the agents with the highest productivities, resulting in an aggregate 
growth rate increase that will endure until new limits to differentiated 
accumulation are found. 
  The unambiguous effect takes place in poor and rich countries alike, 
arising from productivity heterogeneity and redistribution (although it could 
also arise from other sources of heterogeneity), and therefore should not be   23
confounded with the savings rate effect found in the Keynesian framework. 
The effect is explicitly captured in the aggregate growth equation by the 
changes of the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD or Theil’s second measure) 
of the income. 
  This component of aggregate growth rates may appear in any 
aggregated log-linear growth model based on heterogeneous households 
subject to redistribution mechanisms, since the component arises not at the 
structural level, but at the aggregation procedure level. In this sense, the 
inequality-driven effect may be better interpreted as an aggregation growth 
identity than as a structural component resulting from particular model 
hypotheses. 
  Due to the existence of this effect, policymakers may be tempted to 
temporarily accelerate aggregate growth rates by cutting on redistributive 
policies, at the cost however of permanently higher inequality levels and, in 
some cases, at the cost of lower long-run growth rates. 
  The inequality-driven effect found in this paper lends support to the 
strong empirical findings of Forbes (2000). In that paper, panel data methods 
are applied to a data set representing 45 countries and 180 observations. As 
summarized by Forbes, “results suggest that, in the short and medium term, 
an increase in a country’s level of income inequality has a significant positive 
relationship with subsequent economic growth. This relationship is highly 
robust across samples, variable definitions, and model specifications.” 
  The accelerated growth episodes observed in Brazil during the 
seventies and in China recently were shown to be empirically consistent with 
the model. If the model predictions are correct, Chinese growth rates may 
eventually fall, following a pattern that, even if not presenting the same 
magnitude, could resemble the one observed during the Brazilian slowdown.   24
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